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CHAPTER 13
Subordination and discourse segmentation





All approaches to the structural analysis of texts and discourse have to make
assumptions about the smallest units out of which larger pieces of discourse are
constructed. A plausible first candidate for the Status of "minimal discourse
segment" is the grammatical clause, so it cornes äs no surprise that from the
start of an approach such äs Rhetorical Structure Theory (Mann & Thompson
1988), this assumption has actually been put forward. A simple text consists of
a series of simplex clauses, connected by particular conceptual relations mak-
ing the series of clauses into a coherent text. Thus one naturally wants to take at
least all main clauses of a text äs minimal Segments. Complications anse when
other clauses than main ones are also taken into consideration; sometimes one
wants to assign such a clause the Status of segment, sometimes not. This has
also been evident since the beginning of RST. The problem I want to address in
this paper is how to give a principled account of the relationship between
grammatical Subordination on the one hand, and the segmentation of texts
into their minimal units on the other.
Let me begin by reviewing explicitly the motivation for denying certam
non-main clauses the Status of discourse segments. Consider the followmg
example:
(l) They left early; they absolutely wanted to be on time.
This mini-text consists of two segments. The conceptual relation connecting
them and Holding them together äs a textual whole is some sort of causality; a
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competent reader will know that the desire to reach a destination on time
provides a motivation for leaving early, and thus Interpret the contents of the
second segment äs aclually providing the cause of the event described in the
first. Obviously, the number of discourse segments corresponds exactly to the
number of finite grammatical clauses in (l).1 Now consider example (2).
(2) They left early(,) because they absolutely wanted to be on time.
If (1) is considered to be a text, consisting of t wo segments, then (2) is one äs
well. There are also two separately identiflable propositions, and the concep-
tual relationship between them is the same äs in (1). The difference is that the
relationship is explicitly marked äs causal in (2), whereas (1) lacks such a
marking; thus although the Interpretation of (2) can therefore be said to be
more constrained than that of ( l ) , there is no reason to assign it a fundamen-
tally different Status äs a text. Calling (1) a text consisting of two segments and
(2) a single clause text, for example, would clearly miss a generalization. As a
matter of fact, it is intuitions like thcse that motivated the idea that this type of
'clause combining' can actually be regarded äs the grammaticalization (con-
ventionalized structural expression) of discourse relations (Matthiessen &
Thompson 1988).
However, the same kind of considerations (concerning conceptual inter-
clausal relationships) also leads to the conclusion that not all clauses should be
considered to constitute discourse segments. Consider examples (3) and (4).
(3) They left early; it is essential that they be on time.
(4) They left early; they think that in that way they will definitely be on Urne.
With respect to cases like these, one also wants to malce it possible to state a
generalization: there is a conceptual relationship of causality in (3) connecting
its component sentences in the same way äs is the case in (1) and (2), and the
same is true for (4). This requires one to assume that both (3) and (4) contain
two segments, but each contains three finite clauses (the part following the
semicolon consisting of a main and a subordinate clause). Therefore, äs early äs
in Mann and Thompson's original RST-proposal, clauses that functioned äs
subjects (cf. (3)) or complements (cf. (4)) were denied the Status of discourse
segments. Matthiessen and Thompson (1988) called the type of Subordination
exemplified in (2) "clause combining", while the type of Subordination in (3)
and (4) was characterized äs "embedding"; only the former cases are to be
considered äs grammaticalizations of discourse relations, whilc the latter are
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properly viewed äs actual constituents of their host clauses.
Although the notions are not really defined in a fully explicit manner, it is
intuitively clear what the authors are trying to get at, and this distinction also
turns up in later approaches to discourse structure (Pander Maat 1994, p. 30-
36; Sanders 1992, p. 115/6; Sanders & van Wijk 1996, p. 126/7). However, it
should also be noted that the exceptional Status of subject and complement
clauses is not really explained in this way. This becomes even more problematic
when one realizes that there is minimally one more exceptional type of clause:
restrictive relatives. Again, the motivation for assigning these a different Status
is not formulated very explicitly, but it can be made sumciently clear. Consider
examples (5), containing a restrictive relative clause, and (6), with a non-
restrictive one.
(5) These schools all appear to have relatively many students who grew up in
culturally deprived families.
(6) They shouted at the waiter, who so far did not seem to have noticed
them.
One does not want to view (5) äs a text consisting of two Segments primarily
because there does not seem to be a conceptual relationship between the two
clauses making them into a textual whole (i.e. the clause just specifies some
property of its head noun, restricting its denotation; cf. below). In other words,
one does not want to divide (5) into two segments äs indicated in (5)'.
(5)' *a. These school all appear to have relatively many students
b. who grew up in culturally deprived families.
On the other hand, the «ση-restrictive relative clause in (6) does have some
conceptual relationship with the matrix clause (beyond mentioning a property
of its referent): a plausible Interpretation could be that the Situation mentioned
in the relative clause specifies the reason for their shouting at the waiter. Thus
one would want to divide (6) into two discourse segments between which a
textual relation (in this case, of causality) maybe construed; cf. (6)':
(6)' a. They shouted at the waiter,
b. who so far did not seem to have noticed them.
What is it that restrictive relative clauses, subject and complement clauses have
in common which makes them exceptions to the 'rule' that discourse segments
correspond to grammatical clauses? This is the question that has to be an-
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swered in order to make a Start with an explanatory account of the relationship
between the two. In the remainder of this paper, I want to propose a number of
hypotheses intended äs Steps in that direction; äs my point of departure I will
take the analysis proposed in Schilperoord and Verhagen (1998).
2. Conceptual independence and discourse segmentation
Working on the basis of analyses of (non-)restrictive relatives that were devel-
oped independently from the issue of discourse segmentation (Daalder 1989;
Verhagen 1992, 1996a), Schilperoord and Verhagen (1998) propose a condi-
tion on discourse segmentation that can briefly be stated äs follows:
(7) Condition on discourse segmenlation (conceptual independence):
"If a constituent of a matrix-clause A is conceptually dependent on the
contents of a subordinate clause B, then B is not a separate discourse
segment" (cf. Schilperoord & Verhagen 1998, p. 1 50).
This condition utilizes the idea that a mafrix structure may be dependent for its
conceptualization on some subordinate structure (cf. Langacker 1991, p. 436),
and that äs a consequence, the subordinate structure involved cannot be a
separate discourse segment. Thus, it is not so much conceptual dependence of
the subordinate structure that makes it inappropriate äs a discourse segment,
but rather its role in making its matrix structure conceptually independent.
This 'shift' is crucial, äs we will see shortly. But let me first illustrate the
condition by showing how it applies to relative clauses. Consider the restrictive
relative in (5) once more:
(5) These schools all appear to have relatively many students who grew up in
culturally deprived families.
Noüce that the conceptualization of the referent of students is crucially depen-
dent on the contents of the relative clause. The sentence does not say that the
schools have relatively many students (and that thesc grew up in culturally
deprived families), but rather that relatively many students grew up in such
families. In (6) on the other hand, the conceptualization of the referent of
waiter is not crucially dependent on the contents of the relative clause:
(6) They shoutcd at the waiter, who so far did not seem to have noticed them.
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In the non-restrictive Interpretation, the denotation of the waiter is determined
independently of the relative clause, which then provides some additional
Information; this sentence does mean that they shouted at the waiter, and that
he did not seem to have noticed them so far. Thus the explanation is that a
restrictive relative clause is required to cornplete the conceptualization of some
part of another clause, and hence cannot function äs a separate discourse
segment.
Schilperoord and Verhagen (1998) claim that the same condition explains
the exceptional role of subject and complement clauses, i.e. in so far äs it is
exceptional. The point is that the usual formulation of the exception is not fully
adequate. In Mann and Thompson's (1988) original formulation, the claim
was that a subject or complement clause was to be considered äs "part of its
host clause". As long äs we take only relatively simple cases of embedding into
consideration, that procedure gives the desired segmentation, but problems
arise when we apply it to more complicated cases. Such complications actually
abound in the material used for the research reported in Schilperoord (1996);
(8) is a typical example.
(8) a. Te uwer informatie merk ik nog op dat dient voorziet dat het niet
eenvoudig zal zijn om snel ander werk te vinden.
b. Daarbij komt dat zijn echtgenote zwaar gehandicapt is en dat hij een
gezin heeft te onderhouden.
a. Foryour Information Inote that my dient antidpates that itwiM not be
easy tofind another Job fast.
b. To this should be added that his wife is scriously disabled and that he
h äs afamily to carefor".
Fragment (8) consists of two sentcnces (marked a and b); it contains 6 fmite
clauses (indicated by the underlined finite verbs). Sentence (a) actually consists
of a series of embedded clauses, and it is quite conceivable that recursive
application of "Mann & Thompson's ruie" could handle it, producing
the identification of (a) äs a single segment, äs seems desirable. The real
problem is cxemplified by sentence (b). Straightforward application of Mann
& Thompson's rule would result in it being characterized äs a single segment:
each of the two subordinate clauses is a subject clause, to be taken äs a part of its
host clause. However, the segmentation of (8) into two segments (correspond-
ing exactly to the two füll sentences a and b) seems undesirable because it
makes it impossible to capture the fact that the writer of this fragment, a
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lawyer, adduces three arguments in favor of his clients position: the problem of
finding another Job, the health condition of his wife, and the fact that there is a
family to be cared for. The essence of the first of these is contained in the single
right-most embedded clause of (a), while the other two points are presented in
the two subject clauses of (b); äs a result of the way Mann & Thompson's rule is
formulated, it is not possible to recognize the fact that there are actually two
points being made in (b).2
The condition proposed in (7) actually is capable of making the relevant
distinction. The reason is that the relevant property of conceptual dependence
is attributed to the matrix clause rather than to the subordinate one. Notice
that the phrase (in Dutch) Daarbij körnt ("To this should be added"), äs an
instruction to add certain pieces of information to a previously established one,
is not conceptually complete, in a sense not even interpretable, without the
information provided in the subordinate clause. The point is not that this
information could only be provided by a clause (the 'subject slot' could also be
filled by a noun phrase, for example nog iets anders, "something eise"); rather,
the point is that in this case, it is a subordinate clause that fulfills this necessary
function of making the matrix conceptually independent, so that the subordi-
nate clause does not constitute a separate discourse Segment. Now by the same
token, one complete clause always suffices for creating a conceptually complete
message; the unit of a matrix and the first subordinate clause is never concep-
tually dependent on a second one. Consequently, all further subordinate
clauses can be properly characterized äs separate discourse segments,3 so that
fragment (8) may be divided into the three segments indkated in (8)":
(8)" a. Te uwer informatie merk ik nog op dat dient voorziet dat het niet
eenvoudig zal zijn om snel ander werk te vinden.
Foryour information I note that my dient anticipales that it will not be
easy tofind another Job fast.
b. Daarbij komt dat zijn echtgenote zwaar gehandicapt is
To this should be added that his wife is seriously disabled
c. en dat hij een gezin heeft tc onderhouden.
and that he has a family to carefor.
Interestingly, this does not only provide us with a principled account of a
segmentation that is in accordance with our intuitive understanding of such
fragments, it also appears to specify the boundaries of planning units in actual
language production (see Schilperoord 1996, Chap. 6, and Schilperoord 1997).
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Returning to the relationship between condition (7) and Mann and
Thompson's original procedure, we can note that certain clauses that fulfill the
syntactic funclion of subject or complement must in fact be allowed to be
assigned the Status of separate discourse segments. Mann & Thompson's rule
could not accommodate such cases, but condition (7) does, while preserving
the idea that a matrix form s a discourse unit together with a single complement
or subject clause; it furthermore provides a generalization over these clauses
and the restrictive relatives. I therefore consider it a substantial pari of a more
explanatory account of the relationship between grammatical and discourse
structure: Only a relationship of conceptual dependence between syntactically
related clauses is a sufficienl condition preventing them from constituting
separate discourse segments.
Still, there are some remaining questions, in particular:
(a) What is the reason that certain matrix clauses are not conceptually inde-
pendent? Do such conslructions have anything in common that relates to a
specific discourse function, distinct from the discourse function of adver-
bial clauses (the cases of "clause combining" in terms of Matthiessen &
Thompson 1988)?
(b) How do subject and complement clauses differ from restrictive relatives,
such that the latter never constitute separate discourse segments?
(c) How can we avoid the grammatically impossible conclusion, suggested by
the segmentation in (8)", that in fragment (8) a main clause (segment b)
and a subordinate one (segment c) are bcing coordinated?
I believe that there are interesting, interrelated answers to these questions,
which will allow us to further deepen our understanding of relationships
between grammar and discourse, in particular of the discourse function of the
grammatical phenomenon known äs complementation.
3. Dimensions of text Interpretation: (Inter)subjectivity
A fundamental aspect of the human capacity for using language is the ability to
recognize other entities äs essentially like oneself, and to take another person's
perspectivc äs one that could be one's own. For one thing, the whole idea of
intentionally producing utterances to be recognized äs such and to be thereby
understood (i.e. linguistic communication), would not make sense without
that.4 More importantly for my present purposes, this ability is manifested in
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the Interpretation of linguistic utterances in a very general sense: As soon äs
some observable phenomena (sounds, marks in stone or on paper, gestures)
are recognized äs instances of language, this implies that their content is
attributed to some subject of consciousness, possibly unknown, but by implica-
tion seen äs capable of linguistic communication just like the interpreting
person him/herself; if an Interpreter would not take the signals observed äs
having been produced äs such, they would simply not count äs language
(possibly still äs signs, but then non-intentional ones, i.e. Symptoms). Thus the
Interpretation of discourse may always be seen äs not just constructing some
understanding of the events and situations depicted in it, but also äs coordinat-
ing with some subject of conceptualization; the Interpretation of linguistic
discourse necessarily has both a "content-dimension" and a (intersubjective)
"coordination-dimension".5
In view of this inherent, general feature of discourse Interpretation, it
should come äs no surprise that there are several kinds of linguistic elements
and constructions that serve to indicate particular features of this coordination
dimension, for example modal expressions of different types. In the present
context, it seems that this idea is also highly relevant for the semantic charac-
terization of complementation constructions. A natural description of the
function of matrix clauses such äs My dient anticipates... and It should be
added... is precisely that they do not provide Information in the content-
dimension, but rather in the coordination dimension of the Interpretation of
the discourse. The first explicitly instructs the reader to construe the informa-
tional content (e.g. "finding a new Job will be hard") äs an anticipation, of a
particular person. The second provides an instruction by the writer to construe
the content Information (e.g. "He has a family to care for") äs an additional
point, paralleling a previous one. The (more implicit) latter case thus invokes
intersubjective coordination between writer and reader, whereas the former
expression invokes coordination between the reader and a specific individual
mentioned.6 Suppose now lhat we distinguish discourse scgments not just
linearly, in one dimension, but in two, taking this discussion into account.
Then fragment (8) may be represented (somewhat abbreviated) äs in Figure 1:
coordination dimension content dimension
I note that client anticipates: not easy to find other work fast
Add to this thal bis wife is severely disabled
and that7 he has a family to look alter
Figure 1. Text segmentation in two dimensions
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In such a representation, the matrix clauses are not part of segments in the
content dimension. For one thing, this immediately provides an answer to
question (c) mentioned above: In this dimension there is no coordination of a
matrix and a subordinate clause, which allows us to avoid the Suggestion to
that effect in segmentation (8)". However, a more important question at this
point is: Is this just an incidental property of the particular matrix-structures in
this particular fragment, or is this a manifestation of a more general phenom-
enon? How general can the procedure be of assigning the content of matrix
clauses to the coordination dimension of discourse Interpretation?
As a matter of fact, I think such a procedure can actually be fairly general. I
would like to suggest that, whereas constructions with adverbial clauses ('clause
combining', see section l) may be viewed äs grammaticalized expressions for
rhetorical relations (cf. Matthiessen & Thompson 1988), complementation
constructions may be viewed äs general grammaticalized expressions for inter-
subjective coordination (with the lexical content of the matrix clauses and the
complementizers providing the specifics).
To start, it is interesting to have a look at the set of complement-taking
verbs, for example äs listed for Dutch in the comprehensive reference grammar
Algemene Nederlandse Spmakkunst (ANS, both in the first and in the recent
second edition), and especially to see what kind of concepts these verbs ex-
press; the subtypes distinguished by the ANS are presented, with a few ex-
amples, in table l.
Table l. Semantic types of verbs taking 'direct object clauses' according to the ANS
a Verbs exprcssing a Statement, question,
command, promise, etc., i.e. having a
communicative meaning
b Verbs expressing some form of knowing,
believing, supposing, etc.
c Verbs expressing evaluation [including
constructions of the type "find it a pity/strange",
etc.]
d Verbs expressing wish or desire
e Verbs expressing a way of perceiving
/ Verbs expressing causation
(ANS, 1984, p. 840-842; ANS2_ 1997, p. 1156-1158).
There is clearly a generalization to be made over cases (a) through (e): Such
predicates all evoke some mental state or process of a subject of consciousness,
and the content of the complement is to be attributed to this subject of
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consciousness. In other words, these predicates are all "mental space builders"
in the sense of Fauconnier (1994). We could express this generalization in the
form of a "constructional schema" (in the sense of Langacker 1991, p. 546 or
Goldberg 1995): a construction consisting of a mental space building predicate
and a clausal complement means that the contents of the subordinate clause is
to be attributed to the subject of conceptualization referred to in the matrix
clause:8
(9) Complement Construction:
construction form: f s„a NPa [MenlalSpaccPrediule....]
 dat/°fls-b l l
construction meaning: ATTRIBUTE CONTENTS OF S-u το REFERENT OF NPA
Category (f) is different: these predicates indicate causality, with the comple-
ment denoting the result; I believe these can be integrated into the account in a
motivated way, but äs this is only indirectly related to the issue of segmenta-
tion, I will not pursue that matter further here.9 In any case, it is clear that
evoking, in some specifk respect, a mental space for the contents of another
clause is a very general function of matrix clauses of complements.
With respect to segmentation it is important to ask if this is also true for
other matrix clauses, especially those taking subject clauses (another subtype
denied segment-status by Mann & Thompson's rule). In fact, I think it is not
difficult to see that is. First of all, one important category of matrix predicates
of subject clauses are the passive forms of the predicates mentioned in Table l
(It was argued..., It has been claimed..., It can be seen..., in which exactly the
same relation between matrix and subordinate clauses holds äs in the active
voice. Another class consists of matrix clauses in which a predicate nominal
phrase evokes some subjective point of view, i.e. adjectives äs in It is clear/
puzzling..., or noun phrases äs in It is a problem/question....10 Expressions of
this type are specifkations of a cognitive state with respect to the proposition
expressed in the subordinate clause, and thus evoke a conceptualizer entertain-
ing this cognitive state. Thirdly, grammatical subject clauses may be embedded
under 'connecting phrases' such äs Daarbij körnt... (lit. There-to comes...; "It
should be added", "Additionally") in (8), or Hier Staat tegenover (lit. Opposite
to this Stands...; "On the other hand", "Conversely")· This type can be consid-
ered äs evoking subjectivity too, albeit in a way that is more implicit than the
other ones: such expressions are instructions on how to handle information
and therefore imply a subject providing them, rather than that they explicitly
mention some cognitive state with respect to a proposition.
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The matrix of a complement clause always explicitly specifies a source of
subjectivity, while this is not necessary in the matrix of subject clauses. As a
consequence it seems that the subjectivity of subject clause constructions is
usually interpreted äs relating to the producer of the discourse, rather than to
some other entity. Consider (10), for example.
(10) Er is echter dringend behoefte aan nieuwe modeilen. De twee-relatie is
weliswaar een ideaal voor zeer veel homofielen, maar het is duidelijk dat
dat dan heel iets anders is dan het traditionele huwelijk.
Howcver, there is an urgent needfor new models. It is true that the two-
relationship is an ideal for many homosexuals, but it is clear that this will be
entirely differentfrom the traditional marriage.
In interpreting this fragment, a reader will normally ascribe responsibility for
the claim that something is clear to the writer of the text. In other words: the
matrix of a subject clause is usually taken äs a manifestation of speaker/writer
subjectivity (i.e. that of a Speech act participant), rather than äs character
subjectivity (cf. note 6) äs the clause itself contains no reference to a participant
who is the source of the subjectivity. It should be pointed out though, that this
is not an obligatory semantic feature of the construction äs such, but a default
Option given the fact that the construction does not mark a source of subjectiv-
ity and the subjective roles of speech act participants are always available for
use in interpretation. If the context contains an explicit reference to another
subject of conceptualization, then the attribution of responsibility for the claim
is easily changed. Suppose that this fragment was a report about someone
delivering a speech on types of homosexual relationships; then it might well
have been formulated äs in (10)':
(10)' Er is volgens de spreker echter dringend behoefte aan nieuwe modellen.
De twee-relatie is weliswaar een ideaal voor zeer veel homofielen, maar
het is duidelijk dat dat dan heel iets anders is dan het traditionele
huwelijk.
However, according to the Speaker there is an urgent needfor new models. It
is true that the two-relationship is an ideal for many homosexuals, but it is
clear that this will be entirely different from the traditional marriage.
Note that the second sentence in this fragment is actually fully identical to the
one in (10), but that the opinion expressed in it is now naturally ascribed to the
referent of "the Speaker" in the previous sentence. But it is a difference between
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the matrix of a subject clause and that of a complement clause lhat identifka-
tion of the latter's subject of conceptualization is constrained linguistically,
whereas the matrix of a subject clause does not necessarily provide such
constraints, and is thus the only type that allows for speaker/writer subjectivity
without any special markings (complement clause constructions requiring
some form of first person marking). The interpretive 'freedom' for the matrix
of subject clauses is, in my view, a manifestation of the general property of any
instance of language use mentioned at the beginning of this section: it being
taken äs language implies it being taken äs having been intentionally produced
äs meaningful, and therefore implies the projection of some other cognitive
entity like the Interpreter. Whatever entity is available for attributing a particu-
lar thought in a text to can function äs such in the case of subject clauses, but
complement clause constructions have the special property that their matrix
predicate provides a specific constraint on this attribution.
Still, it is clear that a generalization over the discourse function of the
matrix of complement and subject clauses can and should be formulated; the
contents of such clauses is attributed to some subject of consciousness, explic-
itly or implicitly specified in the conceptualization of the matrix clause. This
can be represented by means of a generali/ation of the construction in (9),
which I will call the "embedding construction":11
(11) Embedding Construction:
construction form: [ s _ [Prcdlcaa,.-..] datlof^ ] ]
construction mcaning: ΑΊTRIBUTE CONTENTS OF S-b το
CONCIiPTUAI.IZHR IN S-a
The idea now is that it is the construction's meaning that is the basis for the
conceptuai dependence of the matrix clause on a subordinate one. It specifies
that the reader/hearer should engage in cognitive coordination with some
subject of conceptualization, and such coordination always takes place with
respect to some piece of Information; cognitive coordination is never Void':
there is no illocutionary act without propositional content, no assessment
without an object of evaluation, no instruction to handle incoming Informa-
tion without such Information, in general: no coordination between subjects of
conceptualization without some object of conceptualization. If interpreting a
text involves the alignment of one's cognitive state with that of another, then
such alignmenl necessarily takes place with respect to some informational
content. That is a matter of conceptuai necessity; what is a matter of linguistic
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convention, on the other band, is the degree to which this relationship between
dimensions of discourse Interpretation is 'encoded' in one or more specific
words (for example modal adverbs) or constructions (such äs (11)).
All in all, we now have completed the line of argumentation that allows us
to provide an answer to two of the questions formulated at the end of Sec-
tion 2. First, äs regards question (a), the above analysis contains an account of
what it is that complement and subject clause constructions have in common,
and that explains why the matrix clauses are not conceptually independent:
They provide specifications of the coordination dimension, which must be
completed by some specification in the content dimension.
In a sense, we have thus turned the traditional notion of'dependent clause'
upside down, by showing that it is the matrix clause that is actually conceptu-
ally dependent on a subordinate one. Whereas the original rule formulated by
Mann & Thompson seemed to imply that it was the subordinate clause that
was not independent, we now have reached the conclusion that it is actually the
matrix that should be denied the Status of separate discourse segment (along
with, of course, one subordinate clause). This does not have to conflict with a
functional Interpretation of the notion of Subordination, äs soon äs it is recog-
nized that matrix clauses function in a dimension of discourse Interpretation
Cthat of cognitive coordination with a subject of conceptualization) that is
functionally different from the content dimension (that of providing Informa-
tion). Viewing the embedding construction äs a grammatical Instrument (cer-
tainly not the only one) for indicating relationships between the coordination
and content dimensions of discourse Interpretation allows us to say simulta-
neously that structurally embedded Information is subordinated to something
eise (viz. a mental space, usually in some specific way), and that it often still
provides the most important Information, especially new Information. Also,
several pieces of Information can be subordinated to the same mental space
(recall the string of embedded clauses in (8)), without them becoming just
constituents of a single discourse segment.
Secondly, this approach also provides a basis for an answer to question (b)
at the end of Section 2: What is the difference between subject and comple-
ment clauses on the one hand and restrictive relative clauses on the other, such
that the latter never constitute separate discourse segments? The answer can be
formulated in terms of the distinction between the two dimensions introduced
in this section: Whereas the specific character of embedding constructions
precisely consists in a relationship between these two dimensions, restrictive
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relatives by defmition always function in the same dimension äs their head
noun, and thus in the same dimension äs their matrix clause.
4. Thematic continuity in the content dimension
Before concluding I would like to present an additional piece of evidence
suggesting that discourse analysis may profit from a segmentation procedure
that takes the distinction between the two dimensions introduced in the previ-
ous section into account.12 This evidence involves certain phenomena ofthe-
matic continuity in texts, i.e. indications of how the topic or 'theme' of a
particular discourse segment is connected to previous segments.
In Onrust, Verhagen and Doeve (1993, Ch. 2), two ways are distinguished
in which the initial and final positions of sentences (in Dutch) may contribute
to the thematic cohesion of texts. Given two adjacent sentences S, and S2 in a
text, then:
a. when the sentence initial constituents of S, and S2 refer to the same piece of
information, we have a so-called "constant pattern" (about the same topic,
two Statements are being made);
b. when the initial constituent of S2 refers to the same piece of information äs
a constituent that is (more or less) final in S2, we have a so-called "chaining
pattern".
This is indicated schematically in Figure 2.
Constant pattern:
U, A B ] [ S 2 A CJ
Chaining pattern:
[ S 1 A B] [S2 B C]
Figure 2. Two patterns of thematic cohesion.
These patterns are not obligatory ones, but when used they do contribute to
the cohesion of texts. As they have been defined these notions only apply to the
initial and final positions of (complete) sentences. This sometimes restricts the
applicability of the notions, giving rise to conflicts with language users' intui-
tions about textual cohesion. Students, when applying the analytic method of
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which these definitions form a part, quite generally treat cases like the follow-
ing äs instances of chaining:
b. Het gevaar bestaat dat uw klanten door de aanhoudende vertragingen
ontevreden worden over uw bedriif. Wij denken dat dit voorkomen kan
worden door te zorgen voor een snellere informatiestroom naar de
bezorgafdeling. Een mogelijkheid hiertoe wordt gevormd door ...
"The danger exists that because ofthe continuing delays, your customers will
become dissatisfied with your Company. We think that this can beprevented
by accelerating theflow of Information to the delivery department. One
possible Option in this respect is..."
According to the definitions in Onrust et al. (1993) however, this cannot be an
instance of any pattern, because the demonstrative anaphor dit is not in an
initial position of a sentence.
Now note that between the final position ofthe first sentence in (6) — the
underlined part "become dissatisfied with your Company" — and the demon-
strative in the second sentence is the matrix "We think that" — i.e. Information
relating to the coordination dimension. If we take this into account, and
segment the text äs in Figure 3, it is immediately apparent that in the content
dimension, the demonstrative /sadjacent to its antecedent, so in this dimension
we actually do have a chaining pattern.
coordination dimension content dimension
Het gevaar bestaat dat uw klanten ... ontevreden worden over uw bedriif.
The danger exists that ... your customers will become dissatisfied with your
Company
Wij denken dat dit voorkomen kan worden door te zorgen voor een
We think that snellere informatiestroom...
this can be prevented by accelerating theflow of
Information...
Figure 3. Thematic cohesion in content dimension.
What we may want to propose is that the conditions for patterns of thematic
continuity should apply within one specific dimension of discourse represen-
tation. Given the distinction between the two dimensions äs suggested here, we
may say that material that is linearly intervening but relates to another dimen-
sion than the antecedent and the anaphor, is 'invisible' to the formation of
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patterns of thematic cohesion.
In order to see if this adaptation of the patterning conditions would
account for the actual use of discourse anaphors in spontaneously produced
texts, a search was undertaken in a corpus with text fragments from different
genres,13 collecting all instances of the complementizers dat and ofthat were
immediately followed by a demonstrative with an antecedent elsewhere in the
text (i.e. not in the same sentence). In this corpus, there were 62 instances
satisfying this criterion — thus all of them 'violating', äs it were, the thematic
continuity conditions äs formulated by Onrust et al. (1993). However, taking
the distinctions proposed here into account, 39 of them turn into straightfor-
ward examples of the chaining pattern (perhaps even 42), and 9 (possibly 10)
into examples of the constant pattern. So there are at least 48 out of 62
'excepüonal' cases that turn out to be regulär ones äs an immediate conse-
quence of distinguishing the coordination and content dimensions in the
representation of discourse.
An example of the most frequent pattern, that of chaining, is given in (13).
At the end of one sentence the idea is expressed of the government taking over
the entire production machinery. In the linear text, we then get a matrix clause
opening a mental space assigned to some economists who used to believe
something on theoretical grounds, thus belonging to the coordination dimen-
sion (which is indicated by small capitals), and then, äs the first element of a
new segment in the content dimension, we get the anaphor, referring to the
idea at the end of the previous content segment. Such pieces oftext are indeed
completely natural and unproblematic.
(13) [... ] Wanneer wij, in de rüg gesteund door de moderne economie, het
laissez faire afwijzen, dan staan wij voor de keus tussen twee alternatie-
ven. In de eerste plaats kan de overheid het gehele produktieapparaat
overnemen. SOMMIGE ECONOMEN MEENDEN VROEGER OP THEORETISCHE
GRÜNDEN, DAT dit niet tot gevolg kon hebben dat de welvaart op gunstige
wijze zou worden verdeeld, maar dit standpunt is thans door de meeste
economen verlaten.
"[...] When we, with the support of modern economy, decline the prindple
of'laissez-faire', weface a choice between two alternatives. On the one hand,
the. gnvernment could take over the entire production machinery. SOME
ECONOMISTS USED TO BELibVK ON THEOKETICAL (1ROUNDS, THAT ihJS COuld
not lead to a advantageous distribution ofrichness, but this opinion has now
been abandoned by most economists."
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Fragment (14) contains an example of a constant pattern, that can be analyzed
in a similar way.
(14) De EEG-raad van ministers van landbouw heeft maandag in Luxemburg
in beginsel overeenstemming bereikt over de methodiek van een regeling
voor vlas: er zal een forfaitaire toeslag per hectare worden gegeven [...].
Qver het bedrag van die toeslag zal de Europese Commissie nog een
voorstel doen. MINISTER LARDINOIS VERWACHTTE WEL DAT deze iets hoger
zal worden dan de huidige Nederlandse toeslag [...].
"On Monday, the European coundl of ministers of agriculture has reacheä
agreement in Luxembourg about the method ofa regulation for flax: a
Standardsurchargeper acre will begiven [...]. As to theamountofthe
surcharge, the European Comrnittee will produce a proposal. MINISTER
LARDINOIS DID EXPECT ΊHAT this will turn outsomewhat higher than the
present surcharge in the Netherlands [...]."
Thus there is not only evidence from readers' intuitions, but also from the
distribution of discourse anaphors in spontaneously produced texts, that lan-
guage users treat these devices for cohesion across sentence boundaries in a
way that takes the distinction between the coordination and content dimen-
sions into account. This finding thus provides independent support for the
proposal to systematically use this distinction in the segmentation of texts.
5. Conclusion
The central claim in this paper is that it necessary, for an adequate segmenta-
tion procedure for natural language texts, to take into account two distinct
dimensions of discourse Interpretation with respect to which textual fragments
may be interpreted. The nature of these dimensions is an immediate conse-
quence of an intrinsic property of interpreting language, viz. that it by defini-
tion implies not only processing informational content, but also engaging in
cognitive coordination with some entity projected to be responsible for that
Information. As cognitive coordination in turn presupposes some Information
to function äs object of coordination, the Interpretation of expressions in the
coordination dimension is not conceptually independent from Information in
the content dimension. In these terms, constructions with complement and
subject clauses have been analyzed äs grammatical means for systematically
distributing Information over these two dimensions; the claim is that this
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provides a functional explanation for the condition that in such constructions,
the matrix is not conceptually independent, therefore does not constitute a
separate discourse segment, but needs at least one subordinate clause to make
it conceptually independent (allowing further subordinate clauses to be added
äs separate segments). This view of conceptual independence äs a condition on
discourse segmentation is also empirically superior to previous formulations of
the conditions on discourse segments.
Notes
1. Under certain analyses, the second segment of (l) might be said to properly contain an
infinite clause (the complement of want), but I will not consider that issue in this paper,
though I believe that the present approach can ultimately be helpful in clarifying that äs
well. See Verhagen (1995) for some suggestions.
2. This is not meant to imply that the three arguments are neccssarily to be takcn äs cqual.
Recall that the issue here is just segmentation, not the assignment of (hierarchical) struc-
ture. Thus the grammatical structure of (b) could very well be taken äs an indication that the
last two arguments are to be taken äs constituting a set to be added to the single argument in
sentence (a) (cf. bclow). The point here is simply that the qucstion of segmentation
precedes the assignment of structure.
3. Again: only segmentation is the issue here, not the assignment of structural relation-
ships; cf. note 2.
4. A clear exposition of the view of linguistic communication äs influencing another
person's cognition by displaying the Intention to do so can be found in Keller (1995, p.
153ff., 1998, p. 136ff.). It is crucially related to Grice's (1957) notion 'meaningNN' and also
occurs, in slightly variable forms, in several other approaches to pragmatics.
5. This distinction is related, but not identical, to distinctions bctween different domains
of use, for example the distinction between epistemic and content domains äs proposed in
Sweetser (1990), or that belween pragmatic and semantic sources of cohercnce äs proposed
in Sanders (1992). Cf. Foolen (1996) and Verhagen (1996b, p. 274/5) for some discussion.
6. This difference consists in the distinction between what l called "speaker-hearer-
subjectivity" and "character-subjectivity" (cf. below; also J. Sanders 1994). In certain areas,
such äs that of language change, this difference is vcry important (cf. Verhagen 2000, for an
example).
7- In this representation the coordinating conjunction is taken to be an element in the
coordination dimension, but this is not crucial. At the moment I have no principled
considerations to offer on this point, but I find this represenlation useful for cxpository
purposes.
8. In a different terminology, a similar insight has been formulatcd for ί/iai-clauses, the
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most prototypical subclass of complements, by Wierzbicka (1988: 132-Ί40): "... reference
to knowledge is present in all sentences with THAT" (p.137; Wierzbicka in turn cites a few
other linguists who have proposed partly similar analyses, notably Bolinger). l believe that
the mental space cum construction approach provides a generalization over these and other
types of complements (linking the 'space building' feature to the construction and leaving
other aspects of the semantics to the lexical specifications of the verbs and complementizers
involved), äs well äs one that allows for Integration into a more general theory of perspectiv-
ization.
9. The direction of the generalization I would like to propose is that causation is also
attribution of the Situation denoted by the complement clause to something eise, but then
to an objective factor (i.e. the cause) rather than to a subjeclive one. In that perspective, the
complementation construction would constitute an example of a particular kind of con-
struclional polysemy. See Verhagcn (1996b) for some discussion of this idea, and Foolen
(1996) for somc criticism.
10. In Dutch, the matrix clauses do not have to contain the pro-form it, for neither
catcgory of predicate nominal. Thus Dutch does not only have matrix clauses of the type
Een probleem is dat... ("A problem is that..."), but also Duidelijk is dat.. (lit. "Clear is
that..."). The parallel between these two types is one rcason why in some grammatical
traditions, the initial noun phrase in a clause of the type Een/het probleem is dat.. is analyzed
äs a preposed predicate nominal rather than a subject.
u. As with complement clauses, the matrix of a subject clause may also have a causal
relationship with the subordinate clause (Cf. The result/reason is...). As mentioned in note
9, I think a further generalization is possible, so that we actually have constructional
polysemy here, but I will not pursue that issuc in this paper.
12. There should also be indcpendent grammar-internal arguments for positing a con-
struction such äs (11) äs part of the grammar of a language. I think such arguments can
indeed be provided, at least for Dutch (cf. Verhagen 1996b and Foolen 1996, for somewhat
differcnt views). Furthermore, this analysis has consequences for the grammatical charac-
terization of Subordination äs such. Again, these issues are only indirectly related to the
matter of discourse segmentation, so I will not go into them here.
13. The Eindhoven Corpus, in the version available from the Free University in Amster-
dam; it is describcd in Uit den Boogaart (1975) and Renkema (1981).
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